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This study sets out to synthesize the several country reports to address the terms of 
reference. It therefore examines the nature of the events as they impacted the countries in 2004 
and seeks underlying common local conditions that might have contributed to damage. It 
therefore follows to a great extent the presentation structure of the national reports on the impact 
of the disasters. The study has benefited from a search of the literature on natural disasters and 
visits to the strategic objectives of a number of international agencies that focus on a variety of 
aspects of natural hazards and their impact on societies. It has observed convergence on the 
subject of disaster preparedness and has noted agreement with a number of recommendations 
that the ECLAC team has made in that regard.
This study is structured as follows:
1. It provides some understanding of the approach taken to the study.
2. In Section 3 it describes the events of 2004.
3. The report discusses in synthesized form the macroeconomic indicators that could
be compared across countries.
4. Section 5 of the report presents a discussion of the effects of the natural events of 
2004 on the major sectors.
5. Section 6 abstracts from the reports the causal factors impacting the type and 
extent of damage in the countries.
6. A consolidation of Recommendations emanating from the reports is presented in 
Section 7.
7. Section 8 discusses possible regional mechanisms for joint approaches to follow- 
up on recommendations.
8. Section 9 outlines the training needs to implement the recommendations.
9. In Section 10, a presentation of Lessons Learned is made.
10. Section 11 is an acknowledgement of some o f the other documents consulted.
11. The Annex presents a number of useful tables from the country reports.
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2. APPROACH TO THE STUDY
The country reports, as referred to, have been compiled on the basis of a methodology 
developed by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and 
refined on a continuous basis over the years. The reports compiled after the occurrence of a 
natural event are based on a careful study and documentation of the data and information sets 
and sources that are required to assess the overall impact of the natural event. The evaluation 
begins with the compilation of the relevant data as prescribed in the ECLAC manual for the 
purpose of assessing the conditions that obtained before and after the event. The data present 
two snapshots at two different points in time. The exercise may therefore be regarded in part as 
one of comparative statics. The data sources are both governmental and private sector in origin 
and assist the assessment team to assess damage and losses. The assessment goes beyond the 
comparative statics of impact and recommends rehabilitation and reconstruction projects to be 
undertaken with mitigation against future damage because of the same risk factors and 
vulnerabilities that contributed to the disaster under review. To a great extent, one can refer to 
this aspect of the report as being dynamic. The methodology therefore presents both the 
comparative statics and the dynamics of “getting back on track” better equipped to face similar 
natural events in the future. The rigour of the analysis has made the ECLAC methodology a 
reference point for the consideration of the granting of assistance from the International 
Financial Institutions, notably the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), to the stricken 
countries.
The “Team” referred to in this report refers to the group of experts from ECLAC and 
from elsewhere (for example, Consultants) that was brought together to conduct an evaluation as 
described in this report.
The synthesis of the country reports has been impaired to some extent by the deviation in 
many country cases from the table formats as prescribed in the ECLAC Manual. Those tables 
evince from the country situations the data needed to make the estimates of damage. Deviation 
from them because of the unavailability of data from the countries gives rise to a surfeit of 
anecdotal reporting. A desirable prerequisite to the mounting of a mission should be that the 
countries commit to presenting data in accordance with the required format. Failure to do so 
would result in a report that does not present as homogeneous a clinical analysis as is desirable, 
but the experience over the year has proved that in most instances reports have provided 
acceptable results as required by the donor community to mobilize resources in assistance to the 
affected country’s reconstruction needs.
The unavailability of information to the natural disaster damage assessment teams is due 
to data inefficiencies at the national level and to an apparently precipitated entry into one 
affected country to undertake the assessment. The result was anecdotal evidence and an 
insufficiency of data, let alone standardized tables, which must be the object of the assessments. 
In spite of this, the assessments seem to have an acceptable degree of accuracy and are, in 
general, the best possible approximation under the circumstances.
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Regarding the socio-economic impact of natural hazards, the study is aware of comments 
made in a Caribbean Disaster and Mitigation Project (CDMP) paper entitled “Natural Disasters: 
Linking Economics and the Environment with a Vengeance”. The paper was originally 
presented by Jan C. Vermeiren, PhD, at a conference on Economics and the Environment, under 
the auspices of the Caribbean Conservation Association (CCA) in the latter part of the 1980s.
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS
In 2004 the Caribbean was assailed in quick succession by a number of storms and 
hurricanes of great violence. It would be difficult to ascribe damage in the aftermath of any of 
the September and after hurricanes solely to the event as at that date, as the territories suffered 
from previous visitations whose cumulative effects probably contributed to the September 
disasters1. A chronology of the 2004 events has been well documented in the report of the 
Cayman Islands and is reproduced here for clarity in understanding the dynamics of the assault 
on the countries.
Table 1
H urricane Season 2004: Major events from July to September 
(Taken from  the Cayman Islands Report)
Name Dates Maximum Wind Deaths
(average)
(km / hr.)
Tropical Depression One 31 July 50
Hurricane Alex 31 July- 6 August 200
Tropical Storm Bonnie 3-12 August 110
Hurricane Charley 9-14 August 240 15
Hurricane Danielle 13-21 August 175
Tropical Storm Earl 13-15 August 75
Hurricane Frances 24 August-9 September 240 23
Tropical Storm Gaston 27 August- 116
Tropical Storm Hermine 29-31 August- 55
Hurricane Ivan 2-24 September 275 90
Tropical Depression Ten 7-9 September 58
Hurricane Jeanne 13-29 September 200 2000
Hurricane Carl 16-24 September 232
Tropical Storm Lisa 19 September 116
Source: ECLAC, on the basis o f several sources (taken from Cayman Islands Report).
1 Usually a natural disaster damage assessment team is mounted to visit the stricken country or area to evaluate the 
impact o f  a natural event. In the case of the events o f 2004 as they impacted a number o f  countries, before an 
assessment o f the effect o f the first hurricane could be undertaken, another hurricane struck, hence the difficulty, 
even if  one wanted to do so, o f separating the effects o f  the first as opposed to the second or subsequent events.
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A subset of the weather systems highlighted in the above table is presented in the chart 
below. The graphic presentation indicates the stress on the countries over a relatively short 
period of time. Chart 1 refers.
Chart 1 
Trajectories of Hurricanes Charley, Frances and Ivan 
(Taken from the Report on Haiti)
Source: NOAA
The description of the event shows the differential effects o f the natural events on the 
countries -  a combination of the strength of the hurricane at the time of visitation, the speed of 
forward movement of the system and the natural features of the geographical areas visited. The 
socio-economic, cultural and human interface with the areas also determined the extent of the 
damage. The chart below (Chart 2) is a graphic of the forward march of hurricane Jeanne.
Chart 2
Table 2 below focuses on the events of September 2004, cognizant o f the possible 
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Source: ECLAC, based on country assessments
Table 2 above indicates that the main agents of destruction in all of the events highlighted 
were storm surge, wind and rain which led to flooding and environmental damage. Much of the 
damage to assets was caused by wind in association with the damaging effects of the rains. For 
example, damage to furniture and fixtures in dwellings and offices followed the damage or total 
removal of roofing by the winds. Damage to roads, bridges and coastal housing was the result of 
storm surge impacting on construction and settlements located in hazard zones. Flooding 
brought with it death and the menace of communicable diseases after the floods subsided and 
bacteria were released into the atmosphere. Associated with the extensive damage was the 
location of human settlements in hazard zones, inappropriate construction techniques and lack of 
risk bearing infrastructures aggravated the impact in those countries or territories with the 
highest vulnerability (as in the Haitian and Grenadian case).
This speaks to the role of government in the final determination of where people may be 
allowed to settle. The impact of the events on the countries as presented later in this report is 
seen as directly related to man’s interaction with his environment. A synthesis report by R.A.M 
& Associates LLC Emergency Preparedness2 makes the following point:
“The destructive power of natural hazards combined with vulnerabilities....can
lead to large-scale covariate losses due to events in areas where population and
economic investment are concentrated ...”
Beyond a certain level of damage, economic or social systems suffer fracture or complete 
break down. The tragic situation in Gonaives in Haiti is an example of large numbers of people 
living in a hazard zone and putting further pressure on the natural resources through:
1. The ill effects of high population density.
2. Rapidly increasing population in the area.
3. Traditional methods of procurement of fuel for cooking and heating.
4. Grossly inefficient and low-yield cultivation practices without the benefit of
modem technology.
2 “Natural Disaster hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis”, R.A.M & Associates LLC Emergency Preparedness
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5. Inadequate provision of basic services such as running water and sewerage 
systems
There is no doubt about the link between economic activity and level of development in a 
disaster-prone area and the amount of damage that will be sustained in the event of a severe 
trauma. As the value of investment increases, so much more is put at risk. By the same token, as 
development is more complex and diversified risk management and risk transfer reduce overall 
impact. The study shows that population pressure in risk areas compounds the risk and, more 
often than not, contributes to a worsening of the disaster. The landslides and flooding in Haiti 
demonstrate the effects of a high population on a high-risk area with broken infrastructure. High 
coastal populations and economic activity result in judicious land use being subservient to 
economics. The damage in Gonaive and in the Cayman Islands demonstrates the effect on 
populations of shoreline-based industry and settlement.
Natural disasters and the Millennium Development Goals
The foregoing description of the events of 2004 illustrates the effect of natural disastrous 
events on a country, let alone a poor country. Impact is estimated in terms of percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The countries of the Caribbean are among the countries of the 
third world engaged in trying to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the year 
2015 as a strategy for reducing poverty. This involves the attainment of a set of economic and 
social targets. For example, in addition to the goal of attaining food security, the goals and 
targets require a concerted planning effort, not only by the governments but by them working 
with civil society towards their attainment. The issues of crime and punishment, for example, 
are premised on dialogue and the establishment of communications mechanisms to have the 
goals fully understood. The health targets require, to a greater extent than before, planning at the 
local or small area level so that extreme conditions of poverty do not pass under the radar and 
escape detection and subsequent correction. Much of the success in the achievement of the 
MDGs impinges on the role of government and on the issue of governance as an all-pervasive 
link to development. In the context of this study on the impact of natural disasters, the issue of 
vulnerability to natural disasters must be taken fully on board as it has repercussions on the 
growth trajectory of the countries concerned. Governance must encompass and directly address 
the issue of the unplanned occupation of areas for economic and settlement purposes that 
exacerbates the risk of the populations occupying those areas and, by extension, the economy 
and society at large. To this extent, all factors such as building codes, population density in 
given areas and laws governing setbacks to building away from the high water mark should be 
addressed by governments in their planning paradigms.
When a portion of GDP is lost every few years because of a natural event, the attainment 
of the MDG targets is set back as the activities that should have been devoted to achieving 
progress have to be spent in repair. Moreover, the disaster in as much as it increases the 
population under poverty and causes the destruction of basic infrastructure (such as water supply, 
sanitation, health facilities or schools) further detracts from the attainment of the goals. In 
2004, those MDG targets of the Bahamas, Haiti, Jamaica, Grenada, the Cayman Islands and the
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Dominican Republic were set back as food security in all of these countries became more of an 
elusive dream following the damage to their agricultural sectors.
4. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
Indicators derived from the uniform table completions would have provided an excellent 
standardized analysis of magnitudes and configurations of damage across countries. This report 
presents a limited analysis as afforded by the tables. Table 3 standardizes data on the rate of 
growth of GDP before and projected after the event as well as of tourist arrivals. A uniform set 
of country tables would have led to a more formidable synthesized table of indicators. In the 
absence of this dataset, Table 5 presents a picture of damage at country level. The descriptions 
of damage at country level show the effects on the coastline, especially in the case of the islands. 
Coastal damage, damage to coral reefs and the loss of livelihoods of the people engaged in 
coastal or maritime pursuits as a form of income are described without the numbers being 
anchored to standards such as GDP or total revenue.
Table 3
Macroeconomic Indicators -  annual percent changes






Bahamas -1.3 1.4 2.9 3.0 -4.6
Cayman 4.5 2.6 4.3 3.7 6.7 -5.5
Haiti -2.8 -2.3 -1.3 -5.5
Tourist
Arrivals
Bahamas 15.2 -0.5 5.2 4.4 12.5 15.0
Cayman -3.1 11.8 21.2 12.5 15.0 ...
Haiti
Source: Abstracted from country reports
Although detailed tables are not available, indications are that impact in Jamaica in 2004 
amounted to 8% of GDP. In Grenada, the impact estimate was of the order of 200% of GDP. 
The impact in Haiti, as disastrous as it was in terms of its toll on human life, was of the order of 
1.1% of GDP.
The following text box is taken from the Cayman Islands Report and sheds some light on 
the quality of the damage to the economies of all of the countries in this study with the exception 
of Haiti. The numbers are estimates, hopefully the best that can be found, but they shed light on 
the impact on GDP, which is a useful indicator.
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Table 4 
Impact of 2004 natural events estimated
The 2004 H urricane Season in the Caribbean Subregion
Tropical storm and hurricane activity in the Caribbean basin has been especially notorious in 2004. 
Not only the Small Island D eveloping States have been affected; the bordering continental countries 
have been stricken as well, as the cases o f  Florida and Cozumel in M exico attest.
ECLAC has been called upon to assist the affected island States, through the application o f  its well- 
known damage and loss assessment methodology, to evaluate the impact o f  each disaster. The main 
results o f  those analyses are the following.
Island State Natural Event Economic Impact, 
US$ million
Impact as 
% o f  GDP
Grenada Hurricane Ivan 889 212.0
Jamaica Hurricane Ivan 595 8.0
Dominican Republic Tropical Storm Jeanne 296 1.9
Bahamas Hurricanes Frances and 
Jeanne
381 7.3
Cayman Islands Hurricane Ivan 3,432 183.0
Before the assessment in the Bahamas and in the Cayman Islands were completed, it was assumed 
that the most severe socioeconomic and human loss toll were concentrated in the least developed, 
sm aller countries such as Grenada and Haiti. Nevertheless, the analysis reveals that other island 
states with higher degrees o f  development have been seriously affected as well.
In disasters o f  this type, most losses are sustained by the productive sectors o f  agriculture and 
tourism and are expected to persist fo r a relatively long time p er io d  o f  several years. In addition, 
damage to assets -  especially housing and other essential infrastructure -  also has a negative 
bearing on social wellbeing.
While most o f  the impact fa lls  on the shoulders o f  the priva te  sector, Governments are required to 
take care and assist the lower income strata o f  the population. In most instances, the government's 
capacity to fa ce  these challenges is very limited, and recovery is seriously hampered, especially in the 
fa c e  o f  recurrent disaster events.
It is therefore deem ed essential that all states in the sub region undertake planning measures and 
activities to reduce disaster risk as an integral part o f  their development process.
See ECLAC, www.eclac.cl/mexico
1 1
The social sectors comprising health, education and culture and housing were in most 
cases badly damaged. Notwithstanding the damage to the other sectors, the social sectors may 
be considered to have been among those most severely hit as they impacted persons, many of 
whom had been vulnerable to any type of event. These sectors merit to be highlighted ahead of 
the other sectors for their impact on human suffering.
Housing
Generally, the advanced age of many of the buildings combined with their location in 
areas not conducive to human settlements, but placed there to service extremely large 
populations that had gravitated to hazard-prone areas without official fiat, was the main 
immediate cause of direct damage. In the face of poor statistical databases that have led to 
relatively weak estimates of damage, it is safe to conclude that in each of the countries, over 80% 
of the damage to the housing stock was direct.
In the Bahamas, damage to housing was due to exposure rather than to poor quality of 
construction or materials. In the case of Grenada, an analysis of Hurricane Ivan suggests that 
the probability of a hit as strong and storm surge as great was less than one in a hundred years. 
In this case, the housing stock, which was apparently sturdy, simply could not withstand a 
Category 4 hurricane. In the Cayman Islands, there is no evidence in the report o f poor 
housing stock. Some order existed in the housing sector as the houses were in most cases 
insured. The same does not hold true in Jamaica where, as the ECLAC team had seen on a prior 
occasion, there is a range of quality in housing stock. A problem that is perhaps politically 
difficult is to move people from living in hazard areas. The communities of Bybrook and Swift 
River in Jamaica are in fact flood plains and were visited in late 2001. Location of fishing 
villages in land strips between the shore and lagoons aggravates their exposure and vulnerability 
as made evident in 2004. Without the relocation of the communities that have settled there to 
make a livelihood from farming and ancillary services, a repeat of the floods that accompanied 
Hurricane Michelle is in the offing. The same holds true for fisher folk in the aftermath of the 
2004 hurricanes.
The damage to housing in the Dominican Republic and Haiti is allied to poverty, for the 
most part as well as its location on flood-prone areas. Some parts of the city of Gonaive are 
below sea level even in normal circumstances. Poor construction materials in both cases made 
simple the devastation in housing. Settlements in unstable steep slopes, the agricultural 
practices, tree-cutting for fuel and housing settlement characteristics in Gonaives and Artibonite 
in Haiti and those in the Jimani area in the Dominican Republic contributed significantly to the 
disasters recorded in those locations since May 2004.
Health
In the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands the health sector fared relatively well in terms of 
damage. In the Bahamas, the evacuation of patients in advance of the hurricane reduced damage
5. EFFECTS ON THE MAJOR SECTORS
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and injury. In the Cayman Islands, an exemplary hospital design and construction resulted in the 
hospital withstanding the force o f the winds with minor damage.
In both the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, disaster preparedness and the necessary 
crisis management helped to minimize damage to the sector. Orderly actions kept casualties low 
and the good practice of insurance on assets has ensured relatively painless replacement of assets 
destroyed.
In Grenada, the looting that accompanied the destruction to the Princess Alice Hospital 
must be considered an act of desperation on the part of the people, most of whom lost their 
houses. A people-centred approach to disaster preparedness should not witness such anti-social 
acts as looting. A populace, disciplined in the face of onslaught from a natural event is more 
likely to surmount the immediate problem than a situation in which social cohesion disappears at 
the first 40 mile-per-hour gust. The reconstruction effort should have the benefit of the input of 
town planners and social planners in the new solutions that must be put in place.
Education
In the Bahamas, schools seemed to have fared well in the onslaught. Schools were open 
to pupils in a bit less than one month. Much the same experience was that of the Cayman Islands 
where pupils were out of school for periods ranging from 25 days to 40 days. Damage in the 
Caymans derived from their topography -  extremely low-lying islands lying in the path of a 
strong hurricane. In the Dominican Republic, schools were damaged by flooding and rains. The 
underlying cause may have been the location of the schools in the first place. Reconstruction 
planning will have to more closely address the question of the location of human settlements and 
activities.
Tourism
An attempt to abstract from the tables on tourism and the rest of the sectors was of 
limited success. The data difficulties at national level prevented a proper comparative study of 
the effects on the countries affected.
With the exception of Haiti, all of the countries included in this study have vibrant 
tourism sectors. The Cayman Islands, for example, has a tourism sector that contributes over 
50% of GDP and employs over 27% of the labour force. Table 6 below examines the direct and 
indirect damage done to the tourism sector. Of note is the tendency in almost all of the countries 
for indirect damage to account for a greater portion of total damage to the tourism sector. That 
statistic probably carries with it a tale o f woe as it shows the vulnerability o f the activities allied 
to the hotel industries. It is more than likely the case that the large hotels had carried insurance 
against loss of business. The same does not appear to have been the case with the small 
entrepreneurs who conducted tourism-related business.
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In some cases, such as the Bahamas, the infrastructure could be described as being of 
good quality. The characteristic of the storm as it impacted on the Bahamas was slow-moving. 
This means that the islands were visited by more rain and wind than would have been the case in 
a swifter advancing hurricane. This would suggest that engineering works were constructed to 
certain tolerances that in this event were simply surpassed. This question of building standards 
must be addressed because as the economy develops in economic terms, its real estate stock will 
increase in value and the exposure to damage will be greater.
In the Bahamas, telecommunications links were maintained despite the breaking of a 
fibre optic cable.3 The reason for the continuity in service was entirely the result of the topology 
employed in the design of the network. The same did not apply in the case of electricity. It 
should be possible to design electricity networks on a similar basis. A quick look at the literature 
suggests that a “mesh” approach to distribution could be studied to provide mutual support 
among the islands.
Infrastructure
3 It was not clear at the time o f the study whether the cable actually was severed or just pressed by a sunken object. 
The consequence on reduced quality and interruption of service calls for redundancy or alternate available 
communication.
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Table 5 EFFECTS ON THE MAJOR SECTORS
SECTOR BAHAMAS CAYMAN JAMAICA DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
HAITI GRENADA
Housing Major damage, 
especially near 
shorelines, generally 
and inland on Grand 
Bahama and Abaco. 





Govt, response by 





1.4 million provided 
to 668 households
Housing stock 
suffered damage to 
the extent o f  CIS 
1.44 billion. Some 





14% o f housing 
stock damaged. 
About 5,624 houses 
completely 
destroyed. Most of 
damaged houses not 
covered by 
insurance. Total 
damage to housing 
sector estimated at 
JS14 billion.
Damage to > 7500 




was poor housing 
stock. Extensive 
use o f  makeshift 
materials. Area poor 
and over 30 percent 
o f  households were 
female-headed, 
some precariously 
located. Some o f the 
area was tourist 
oriented and other 
parts were sugar­
cane and cattle 
lands. Total damage 
to sector was 
RDS356.9 million. 
O f this RDS294.8 
million was direct. 
Indirect damage was 
RDS62.1 million.
Main underlying 
cause o f  damage 
was a degraded 
environment due to 
over-exploitation o f 
natural resources. 
Topography o f 
Gonaives is flat and 
below sea-level. The 
increased population 
resulted from the 
urban creep in 
which people from 
rural areas flock to 
the city in search o f 
employment. This 
added to the already 
existing poverty. In 
the city, damaged 
drainage system 
increased the 
vulnerability o f  the 
city to landslides 
and flooding. Total 
damage to Housing 
was G4.2 billion. 
No estimate o f  
indirect damage.
Damage to this 
sector was estimated 
to be EC$ 1.38 
billion, o f  which 
ECS 1.3 7 billion was 
direct damage. The 
import content o f  
the replacement is 
estimated to be o f  
the order o f  ECS 1.1 
billion.
Health Department of 
Public Health well 
prepared before the 
event. Evacuated
Damage to this 
sector was estimated 
at CIS 19.0 million. 
The health sector
Total damage close 
to JS 758.3 million, 
o f  which direct 
damage was some
Ministry o f  Health 
moved in teams to 
control the outbreak 
o f  communicable
Some 3,000 dead, 
2,600 injured and 
14,000 homeless. 
Hospital in
Damage to major 
public hospitals, 
health centres & 
other medical
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patients in good 
time. Estimates o f 
damage were not 
available for Private 
hospitals. Dept, o f 
Environmental 
Health provided 
support in clearing 
debris & mounted 
an insect vector 
control and food 
safety initiative as 
well as larviciding, 
fly control and 
management o f 
animal waste. 
Summary of impact 
on the health sector 
is incomplete 
because o f  lack o f 
statistics.
received the least 
damage among the 
social sectors. 
Apparently good 
design o f  hospital 
enabled it to 




J$ 718.2 million. 
Population 
inadequately 




About 145 shelters 
and other 
accommodations 
held 22,313 people. 
Damage estimated 
at RD$ 92.1 million. 
O f this, RDS5.4 
million was direct 
damage, while 




damage to Health 
sector was G 172.5 
million. O f this, 





at EC$ 11 million. 
O f this amount, 
damage to General 
Hospital was ECS 
4.5 million. Major 
damage to hospital 




damage sent the 
damage figure to 
ECS 3.5 million.
Education Mostly minor 
damage to schools. 
Schools re-opened 
in less than 1 month.
Damage valued at 
CIS 44.8 million. 
School days lost 
varied from 25 to 40 
per student. About 






light direct damage. 
Some indirect 
damage associated 
with use o f  schools 
as shelters.
Schools damaged by 
wind and flooding. 
Total damage to 
Education sector 
was RDS44.9 
million, o f  which 
RDS43.6 was direct 
and RDS1.3 million 
was indirect.
Public sector 
education system is 
inadequate. Haiti is 
second country in 
the world where the 
private sector 
services the 
education needs o f  
the majority o f  
pupils. Total 
damage to education 
sector was G203.7 
million. O f this, 
G200.9 million was 
direct damage. 
Indirect damage was 
G2.8 million
The nature o f 
damage (wind and 
rain) caused an 
estimated damage o f  
ECS 215 million. 
Most o f  this was due 
to damaged or 
completely 
destroyed roofing. 
Also in the Culture 
aspect o f  education, 




estimated at ECS 
83.2 million, o f  
which damage to the 
stadium was
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estimated to be EC$ 
80.1 million.
Tourism Taxes from this 
sector contribute 
10% o f Govt. Taxes. 
Direct damage 
mainly to roofing 
and furnishings. 
Indirect losses were 
covered by 
insurance. Arrivals 
in September 2004 
40% lower than in 
Sept. 2003.
Tourism contributes 
>50%  o f GDP & 
employs >27% of 
labour force.
Whereas the report 
contains some 
description of 
damage to the 
tourism sector, it 
does not present a 
standardized table 
showing the effect 
o f damage o f  the 
sector to GDP.
In 2003 tourism 
represented 8% of 
GDP as compared 
with 3.8% in 1990. 




generador o f  foreign 
exchange ( 37% o f 
the total). It is 
estimated that the 
sector generated 
164,694 jobs in 
2003, some 29% of 
them direct.
The tourist sector 
suffered extensive 
damage to its 
accommodation 
units as roofs were 
blown o ff and 
fixtures and 
furnishings 
damaged by the 
winds. The 
yachting sector 
suffered the loss o f 
some boats and 
other damage. The 
estimate is for a 




COMPARATIVE EFFECTS ON THE TOURISM SECTOR






LOSSES LOSSES AS % 
OF TOTAL
LOSSES AS % 
OF DAMAGE
Tourism Bahamas OOOBah $ 109,935.3 29,313.3 80,622.0 73.3 275.0
Cayman OOOCI $ 462,421.2 281,890.0 180,531.2 39.0 64.0
Dominican
Republic 000RDS 2,689.0 1,534.9 1,154.1 42.9 75.2
Haiti Gourdes
Jamaica Million JS 1590.7 466.3 1,124.4 70.7 241.1
Grenada ECS million 264.3 196.7 67.6 25.6 34.3
Source: Extracted from country reports
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6. CAUSAL FACTORS IMPACTING THE TYPE AND EXTENT OF DAMAGE
The report to this stage has highlighted a number of factors contributing to the impact in 
the countries.
Firstly, the mere position of the countries affected, lying as they do in the Caribbean 
hurricane zone and often in the path of hurricanes that within more recent times have become 
more violent, pre-disposes them to damage. Resulting from this geographical attribute, damage 
from floods and landslides due to intense rainfall were the major causes of harm to housing and 
to agriculture.
The low-lying nature of the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands deprives them of higher 
ground to occupy easily. The result is that building to setback specifications will hardly protect 
against massive storm surge. In the case of the Bahamas, it has been recommended by the 
ministry and international organizations4 that to minimize future potential natural disaster- 
associated crop losses, replanting of long-term crops should be done only in areas where there is 
no history of localized flooding or storm surge. Whereas it seems to be the correct thing to do, a 
way will have to be found to “convince” the farmers to relocate their operations. This may well 
involve a total re-set of their habitat, their lifestyle and their ancestral ties. For example, some 
societies would react against abandoning their dead in cemeteries that would now become 
remote from their places of relocation.
In addition, the importance of tourism to many of the countries demands littoral 
activities. Human settlements are usually formed in association with economic activity and 
opportunities to earn livelihoods. Damage is further aggravated when the constructed tourism 
infrastructure (including landscaping and facilities such as golf courses) interfere in the natural 
dynamics between the beach and shore and the backwaters and mangrove forests.
4 FAO offered a national technical cooperation project (TCP) that would look at inputs as relief to farmers and, 
alongside the Caribbean Development Bank, were looking at a risk mitigation project with respect to agriculture, 
taking a similar pilot effort in Jamaica as a starting point. The Government intends to request a TCP on hurricane 
preparedness. This would be reinforced by the proposal being discussed since November 2003 for another one to 
restructure the public marketing system.
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Despite information on the risks associated with building on the edge of the water, 
tourism plants will continue to be built with the investor/proprietor taking a calculated risk of 
damage. In that case caution will be taken to secure insurance coverage, albeit at high rates. The 
infrastructure of the country relates to the economic activity. For example, an examination of 
transport and coastal infrastructure in the Bahamas shows the following areas of damage:
Airports






Estimated cost of road operation and transport services in current circumstances 
Loss of vehicles
The same type of damage is evident in the Cayman Islands.
In the poorer communities, usually of the larger territories, the priority of the poorer 
communities is to secure housing and food in close proximity to each other. The establishment 
of human settlements in flood plains or on slopes made unstable by “slash and bum” approaches 
to procuring land for agriculture, largely subsistence, is a calculated action with known 
probabilities of disaster. To such communities, seeming food for the immediate needs of the 
body enjoys a higher priority than considerations of the probability of occurrence of an adverse 
natural event.
General observations
1. The ECLAC methodology distinguishes between damages and losses and tracks the 
secondary effects but does not take into the reckoning the permanent or lasting impact of 
the sort that would result in the degradation of the physical environment.5 The 
methodology acknowledges the possibility of land loss or loss of environmental resources 
but given the imperfect nature or insufficiency of the market to fix appropriate prices to 
environmental resources, focuses on valuing the loss (or impact) on environmental 
services that do have a market value. Environmental services are in many cases linked to 
sectoral activities and products, as in the case of agriculture and tourism, and the negative
5 The impact o f  an event comprises both damage and losses. So called damage refers to the impact that the disaster 
has on assets, be these physical, social, economic or environmental, i.e. includes “human capital” as far as there is 
sufficient pre-disaster baseline date. Losses refer to the effect o f the disaster on flows (income, expenditure, 
investment, capital gains or losses, exports and imports, and financial flows in general. “Secondary” effects refer to 
the impact on the performance of the most relevant economic variables in the short- to medium- term (five years at 
most). Longer-term impact is not possible to ascertain with any degree o f certainty as other factors influence the 
overall performance of the economy. By the same token, long-term environmental impact is fraught with too many 
uncertainties such as climate variability and change to be able to adequately isolate the effect o f  one single event.
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impact of environmental damage will be reflected in the specific sector. Special cases are 
when environmental services such as CO2 capture or water retention has a market value, 
but this is not the case in the Caribbean, in general. In addition, ECLAC is aware of the 
fact that some environmental damage is self-correcting in the long run, although losses 
may be incurred in specific sectors or short-term corrective measures will be made as in 
the case of beach replenishing and landscape reconstruction. It is the belief of the 
consultant that reports as yielded by the application of the ECLAC methodology serve 
the purpose intended and that their scope and orientation are appropriate.
2. The task of reviewing the country notes was made more difficult as the presentation of 
statistical tables was not as meticulous as it should have been. In a number of reports, 
there emerged some confusion as to the unit of measurement that was being used to 
measure values. This detracted from the time within which the task was to be completed. 
For the macroeconomic impact both present value and constant price data should be 
systematically presented. The actual damage value has to be explicitly established and 
indicated at replacement value, book value or restoration costs, as esteemed more 
appropriate in the specific sector. Comparability and non-duplication of data are 
essential criteria to be carefully applied.
7. CONSOLIDATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
FROM THE ECLAC REPORTS
This section presents some of the recommendations made and presented in the reports. 
The sense of the recommendations has for the most part been captured in the edited list of 
recommendations that appear in this section.
• The ECLAC methodology is based on data and information flows that are 
organized in the countries and which can be unlocked at the time of the disaster to 
avoid gross overestimations of damage coming from traumatized data providers, 
or underestimations due to lack of information or yielding to the political and 
economic pressures to minimize the negative external image that may affect 
sensitive activities such as tourism.6 At an early stage in ECLAC’s training 
sessions with a number of countries, the need for data and information was made 
clear. Governments must understand the importance of harmonized data and 
information collection and management and take steps to design, construct and 
manage their data and information architectures. The lack of adequate data has 
resulted in estimates of damage that at best can only be considered to be “orders 
of magnitude”. ECLAC has for a number of years provided technical assistance 
in the establishment of integrated national databases to the countries of the 
Caribbean. A more urgent approach to building those databases in partnership
6 Worldwide coverage o f  a disaster portraying an important tourism destination as devastated by a hurricane or 
prone to health hazards in its aftermath will lead to travel cancellations and diversion to other destinations, even if  
there is no actual damage or minimal destruction in the tourism infrastructure, thus causing heavy losses to the 
sector and, in highly dependent countries, negative impact on its economic performance.
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with the countries would be preferable to mere advocacy which does not seem to 
have had the anticipated effect.
• Training o f nationals o f all Caribbean countries in the understanding of the 
ECLAC methodology is a must. The concepts o f direct and indirect damage have 
more recently given way to the categorization o f damages and losses. The 
trainers must first all be brought “up-to-speed” with the recent changes before 
they train at national level. The fact that this new change did not permeate to the 
level of the assessment teams has given rise to some diversity in the writing o f the 
reports. The concept of what was called “secondary effects” -and now referred to 
as global impact must become clear to personnel at national level who can serve 
as the first collectors of data to strike early estimates of damage and to work with 
the ECLAC assessment team when it undertakes its mission.
Risk reduction and transfer considerations
•  The countries should, as part o f their planning process, give equal importance to 
physical planning, risk reduction and financial transfer mechanisms, taking into 
account the exposure to risk of the country in question. This should lead to the 
development of a national disaster management policy, complete with disaster 
warning drills for appropriate public defensive action, and the promotion of 
appropriate economic instruments such as insurance schemes, disaster prevention 
funds and catastrophe-bonds. This recommendation was strongly made in the 
Bahamas study which encouraged the participation o f the community in all 
aspects of confronting exposure to natural hazards. The encouragement to secure 
insurance would be an important risk transfer mechanism, especially at the level 
of the household. Most establishments engaged in the productive sectors, and 
especially tourism, have already espoused this form o f risk transfer. The term 
“risk transfer” is used to mean “shifting the responsibility or risk financing burden 
to another party”.
• Governments should initiate a programme under the IDB, Caribbean 
Development Bank (CDB) and/or the World Bank’s disaster prevention and 
hazard management facilities, including the appropriate training in methodologies 
that, firstly, rapidly express the emerging needs assessment (such as the Damage 
Assessment and Needs Analysis (DANA) and others); and express total damage 
and losses and their implications (as is done by the ECLAC methodology) to 
determine changes in the country’s macroeconomic situation, its capacity to 
mobilize, execute and absorb the resources for the reconstruction process. Part of 
this second set o f actions should be to enhance the country’s response mechanism 
and emergency management, namely the National Emergency Management 
Offices (NEMO) and the appropriate planning and budget institutions.
• Projects aimed at rehabilitating and strengthening o f the country’s infrastructure 
should be coupled with more resilient national development strategies.
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• Institutional strengthening in terms o f having both appropriate legislation that 
promotes risk management, transfer and reduction and appropriate information 
management and coordination should be promoted among public sector offices 
and institutions and the private sector. Risk transfer is possible once risk 
“ownership” is established formally and affected activities do not externalize risk 
management costs to government. This is to say that the financial viability of 
economic activities in the private sector should include investment in risk 
management.
• Projects should be initiated to promote information networks to keep the 
population informed of the approach o f the natural event and to act as an effective 
early warning system.
• In countries and areas prone to landslides that have been the result o f de­
forestation, programmes of re-forestation and alternative land use should be part 
of their poverty reduction strategies.
•  In all countries, land use zoning and building codes should not only be revisited 
but enforced. Design and construction should be done to withstand at least 
Category 4 hurricanes. Existing buildings, including houses, should be retrofitted 
-particularly those that provide basic social services such as health facilities, 
schools and other structures used as shelter— with appropriate roofs, shutters, 
paint on external walls and other measures to reduce damage due to wind and 
rains. In the case o f housing, retrofitting could be tied with government-sponsored 
actions tied to insurance schemes and construction/retrofitting credits to 
households.
Regarding development issues and longer-term considerations, the following areas are 
proposed as priority:
Follow-up work to the Climate Change Project.
The identification and implementation o f training for the national emergency 
management organizations and the Meteorological Service.
The need for a/physical planning update as part o f a national plan to include 
disaster mitigation strategies and climate change considerations.
Poverty reduction and attainment of MDGs tied to vulnerability reduction and risk 
management policies at the micro level (i.e. self insurance, microcredit and micro 
insurance schemes).
This report brings to the fore an observation made in the recommendations section of the 
Haiti Report that is substantially translated with editorial adjustment by the consultant. The 
comment suggests that the ECLAC disaster damage assessment is reactive. If nothing changes
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this stance, the reports would perhaps always describe the same types of damage. The consultant 
interprets this to include the ECLAC response. The strategy o f intraregional cooperation should 
go beyond the phase that reacts to an event to make provision for preventative, risk reduction, 
mitigation and management and risk transfer actions.
The instruments of management and transfer o f risk at the Caribbean subregional level 
should be conceived and developed in such a manner as to become an aspect o f the regional 
strategies for development and integration. The submission of the consultant is that a partnership 
between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), IDB and ECLAC with regional 
institutions such as the CDB together with the respective governments and any other 
organization with the required competence should be formed to address in a proactive manner 
the issues o f prevention, risk management and risk transfer.
The internal environment -  Reduction of vulnerability of the population
The reduction of the vulnerability o f the population through the strengthening of their 
resilience to future natural hazards must be the aim of any reconstruction effort. To this end, 
several recommendations are put forward:
• Small grants, soft loan facilities or community micro-financing facilities to assist 
persons in the rural and coastal communities to rebuild their livelihoods. 
Particular grants/lending facilities should be targeted to the fisheries sector, 
farmers and the women of those communities who lost assets through damage to 
small shop holdings and home-based enterprises, such as food preparation and 
backyard gardening.
• Projects that support the improved resilience o f schools and health centers as they 
are used as shelters should be paired to access to education by the school age 
population.
• School book, meals and uniform grants (including footwear grants) should be 
carefully planned and introduced as many children walk to school in the rural 
areas.
• Model starter homes, built to standards which will resist the devastation of 
hurricane force winds, should be constructed as demonstration units for 
communities, many of which will be involved in self help projects to rebuild their 
communities.
• Housing settlement location and hazard mapping should be undertaken to avoid 
the continued situation of having communities live in heavily exposed areas.
• Projects that support public health and sanitation education should be supported to 
reduce the burden on the health system and establish an alternative to the reliance 
on the major health institutions for the resulting health issues that follow poor 
sanitation.
• Study and emulate the “best practice” of the Bahamas Hospital in terms of its 
design to withstand a Category 4 or 5 hurricane.
• In all countries, as part of the enabling of the communities to cope with the effects 
of a natural disaster, a mechanism to address the psycho-social trauma of the
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affected population should be put in place. Such support is required for all 
persons affected but particularly the most vulnerable: the women, children and the 
elderly in the rural communities. The mechanism can effectively introduce 
disaster prevention and mitigation education.
• In order to minimize human suffering in the immediate aftermath o f the natural 
event, there should be public sector projects aimed at water and food warehousing 
at all times in the event of need after damage occasioned by a natural event.
To the extent that all planning for vulnerability reduction will be made at the level o f the 
Ministry o f Planning, all major actors will form the team. In additional, the fiscal impact o f all 
mechanisms to be introduced will be provided for.
Summary of the recommendations from the countries and other agencies
It is clear that information is seen as the frontier to be conquered in the effort to reduce 
vulnerability and to measure the effects o f damage and losses. In a paper entitled 
’’Considerations for the adequate management o f disaster information centers CRID” delivered at 
a Regional Meeting to Develop a Toolkit for Disaster Information Management, held at the 
Radisson Europa Hotel in San Jose, Costa Rica, on 21-22 September 2004, the following 
recommendation was made. It is quoted below:
“Paradoxically, many of these negative effects could be reduced, and most of their causes 
prevented if both governments and the population at large, made adequate use of existing 
information on, for instance, the consequences of population growth and urban density, 
environmental deterioration and climate change. Although natural and other related risks 
pose threats to every society, in reality these risks are proportionally more destabilizing in 
developing countries, including some specific regions in the Americas.”
The same paper again addresses the importance o f the creation o f information support 
systems to inform decision-making. The following point is made and is presented below:
“Clearly, the use of information in order to make decisions and carry out planning 
processes must go beyond the simple monitoring of the catastrophic effects of natural 
disasters on economies, societies and the environment, as well as the reconstruction 
planning process following a catastrophe.”
The recommendation emerging from the foregoing is that ECLAC should recognize that 
it performs that function and seek to put in place the national capabilities as part of its 
development assistance to the Caribbean and Latin American countries. This will involve inputs 
from the statistical and economic development divisions as well as other substantive units o f  
ECLAC throughout the region.
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8. POSSIBLE REGIONAL MECHANISMS FOR JOINT APPROACHES TO 
FOLLOW-UP ON RECOMMENDATIONS
A Caribbean-wide strategy for risk reduction
One recommendation appearing in the Cayman Islands report addressed the issue of risk 
reduction. The recommendation observed the sophistication of the finance sector in the Cayman 
Islands and suggested that they were particularly well positioned to develop new innovative 
instruments for risk transfer and reduction that might lead to a regional Canbbean strategy that 
spreads and reduces risk among countries. This would reduce the risk o f any particular territory 
and lower the cost of insurance and reinsurance premiums while expanding the insurance market. 
This suggestion finds resonance in the recommendation found in the Report on Haiti which 
appears in the following paragraph in an edited working translation.
This report recalls the recommendation o f the Report on Haiti that sees the effects of the 
hurricanes in 2004 as being at one and the same time a challenge and an opportunity to all 
countries in the region. The differentiated effects o f the events illustrate the direct relationship 
between the process o f development, vulnerability and the capacity to respond, to reconstruct 
and to do so with mitigation. The strategy of intraregional cooperation should go beyond the 
phase that reacts to an event to make provision for preventative, mitigation and management and 
risk transfer actions. The latter suggestion is the combined result o f our exposure to recurring 
seasonal phenomena such as hurricanes and our physical, economic and social vulnerability. 
The instruments of management and transfer o f risk at the Caribbean subregional level should be 
conceived of and developed in such a manner as to become an aspect o f the regional strategies 
for development and integration.
The future UNDP intervention in planning to help define development projects to face 
reconstruction needs while promoting disaster mitigation, risk reduction and risk management 
should be Caribbean-wide in its scope. The interaction between physical, social and economic 
planners and their legal arms would make for a fruitful discussion, not among academics, but 
among technocrats who could move the vision forward into directly productive action.
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9. TRAINING NEEDS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
The events o f 2004 have shown that information -both at country and local level- was not 
as available as it should have been7. To this point there continues to be a disconnect between the 
training delivered at national level and the Administration in the countries where training in the 
ECLAC methodology has been delivered. All countries of the Caribbean should be trained in the 
ECLAC methodology, aiming not only at disaster management institutions but including 
planning and statistical offices, economic affairs and finance authorities and private sector 
organizations and business and industry associations.
At national level, heads of national disaster assessment teams should be designated and 
they should receive training as a separate group or they could receive training by being attached 
to assessment teams outside their own countries in the event that they are for that moment spared 
the damage o f a natural event.
A number o f countries have fledgling units that respond to national emergencies. Work 
visits to established national emergency management offices, such as the Office o f Disaster 
Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM) in Jamaica, or NEMO in Belize should be 
arranged. The Cuban experience in disaster response to reduce human impact and minimize life 
losses could also provide useful experience sharing in the region.8
7 The countries continue to be deficient in the production o f  national accounts and their supporting tables. These 
tables will supply the greater portion o f  the datasets required as their supporting tables will capture data on 
production, costs o f  production and other aspects o f  the economy that would assist in the making o f  a plausible 
estimate o f  impact.
8 Although ECLAC did not conduct an assessment o f  the impact o f  the hurricane season in Cuba, the preliminary 
balance o f  the Cuban econom y conducted by the ECLAC Subregional office in M exico points out that over US$1.5  
billion o f  damages and losses were estimated by government, with minimal human suffering.
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10. LESSONS LEARNED
The following are some of the main lessons learned:
1. The main lesson learned was that the smaller the country, the more devastating 
will be the damage, as there will be no regions spared the onslaught o f the event. 
It means that the smaller countries must take care to locate their utilities and 
health services in areas that are relatively safe from flooding and landslides. On 
this matter, private developers should be held responsible for their actions that 
accentuate damage and should be made to reverse their works that affect the 
natural ecological/environmental balance.
2. In all cases studied, the role of government is seen as crucial. Governance issues 
are all the more important and urgent in the case of small economies that tend to 
be the most vulnerable to natural events. In all countries studied, the need for 
effective disaster preparedness and risk reduction measures is urgent.
3. As economic development takes place and wealth accumulates, the greater will be 
the risk of severe damage and loss. This means that hand in hand with 
development, must be planning against the geographical/geological and other 
hazard factors to which the country is exposed.
4. The higher the level o f development attained, the more robust must engineering 
works be. On the other hand, the less diversified the economy, losses will not be 
compensated among different sectors.
5. For small islands that are somewhat remote from each other, food and water 
security must at all times be present. External links to other nearby countries 
should be maintained, as well as reasonable emergency stocks.
6. At national level, risk management activity should be carried out at the local, 
community level (parish, settlement, village or municipality) as the appropriate 
political subdivisions and geographical areas that are prone to natural disaster 
damage.
7. The preparation for hurricanes should be made within a multi hazard framework 
since other less frequent events such as earthquakes and . olcanoes are also 
present in the region. This preparation would be an integral part o f management 
and planning as well as part of the education curriculum at all levels.
8. The location and physical design of schools should make the n more suitable for 
providing reasonable accommodation as shelters. This is ai ¿o true for other 




Commonwealth of the Bahamas: Summary of damage and losses 
caused by hurricanes Frances and Jeanne (B$ millions)
Direct damage Indirect losses Total External
component
228.59 322.33 550.92 344.59
Productive sectors 39.95 284.35 324.30 239.19
Tourism 29.30 250.00 279.30 223.44
Agriculture 10.65 34.35 45.00 15.75
Infrastructure 92.24 12.17 104.40 57.68
Transport 44.45 3.39 47.84 30.25
T elecommunications 37.15 37.15 24.15
- Electricity 2.80 6.00 8.80 1.82
- Water and sewerage 0.54 2.78 3.32 0.35
Public buildings 7.30 7.30 3.29
Social sectors 96.40 2.47 98.87 44.62
Housing 71.70 0.20 71.90 31.20
Health 2.90 2.25 5.15 3.60
Education 21.80 0.02 21.82 9.82
Emcraencv relief 1.75 1.75 -1.22












2000 2001 2002 2003 /a 2004 a/ 2004 a/
Annual rates o f  growth b /
Gross domestic product (1991 
prices)
5.0 -2.0 2.3 0.2 3.0 -1.7
in Bahamian dollars
Gross domestic product per 
capita
16,205 15,997 16,218 16,691 17,1 >2 16,407
Annual rates o f  growth b /
Real sector indicators (rates of 
growth)
Tourist arrivals 15.2 -0.5 5.2 4.4 16.4 10.6
Value o f  construction starts 19.0 -8.0 55.0 -6.9 -
Value o f  construction completions -34.2 8.0 -5.9 -12.7 -
Electricity generation (mwh) 6.9 3.9 5.6 -1.6 -
Balance of payments M illions o f  Bahamian dollars
Current account balance -A ll -348 -339 -All -24.3*
Merchandise balance -1,371 -1,151 -1,151 -1,204 -361*
Exports fob 805 614 740 681 --
Imports fob 2,176 1,765 1,776 1,885 --
Services balance 1,029 951 980 902 334*
Income balance -173 -190 -211 -163 -24*
Unilateral transfers 43 42 42 38 9*
Financial and capital balance c/ 410 318 400 538 133.4*
Net foreign direct investment 250 101 169 145 -
Financial capital d/ 161 217 79 292 --
Global balance -61 -30 61 111 109*
Variation in reserve assets e/ 61 30 -61 -111 109*
Other indicators o f  the external 
sector
External debt (millions o f  
Bahamian dollars)
368 346 311 349 —
External debt (% o f  GDP) 7 7 6 7 -
Prices
Rate o f  change in the consumer 
price index (end o f  period)
1.0 2.9 2.2 3.0 2.8
Weighted deposit real interest 
rate
2.2 2.2 2.1 1.0 1.0 ay
Weighted lending real interest 
rate
9.9 9.3 9.1 8.1 8.0 ai
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Central governm ent Millions o f  Bahamian dollars
Recurrent revenue (budget) 930 986 1023 1062 1176
Current expenditure 846 836 954 969
Capital account deficit (budget) 132 138 137 142 137
GFS deficit 14 164 188 122 164
Percentage o f  GDP
Overall balance with grants
Overall balance without grants 
and net lending
0.4 -0.7 -2.6 -2.9 -3.5 a!
Mone} ind credit M illions o f  Bahamian dollars
Don' < ic credit 4,158.5 4,676.9 4,940.4 4746.18 5225.3V +
To ■ he public sector 647.4 774.8 870.8 705.54 950.62 r
To he private sector 3,511.1 3,902.1 4069.6 4040.64 4274.77 +
Liquidity (M3) 3,464.6 3,624.6 3,742.7 3931.82 4374.39+
Mo e\ supply and deposits in 
national currency (M2)
3,378.3 3,532.7 3,651.1 3,676.8 4100.5O+
Foi e en currency deposits 86.3 91.8 91.6 -
Sourc fcCLAC on the basis o f  official information.
a/ Pn minary figures 
b/ At >nstant 1991 prices, 
c/ Incl les errors and om issions
d/ Incl les the capital and financial balance minus net foreign direct investment and plus errors and omissions 
e/ The ! -) sign indicates an increase in reserves 





Macroeconomic Indicators 1999 - 2004







domes! L- product (CIS 
millioi current)
1,382.50 1,444.90 1,482.30 1,546.00 1,603.20 1,710.00 1,616.03
Gross i )omestic 
Produt : (1986 prices)
803.80 811.80 816.70 830.60 847.20 873.50 860.39
Grow. It in real Gross 
domes! ic product 
(1986 prices)
3.40 1.00 0.60 1.70 2.00 3.10 -1.50
Gross domestic 
product per capita 
(CIS000)
35,220.83 34,705.83 34,556.67 35,000.00 34,970.00 35,634.17 33,675.96
Emplo ment. waees 
and pi es
unen oymentrate 7.50 5.60 5.60 3.90
Tota, anployment 26,608.00 28,091.00 28,871.00 29,991.00
Rate f change in the 
consui er price index
6.80 3.00 1.30 1.70 1.20 1.90 2.50
Non . al exchange 
rate
1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
Wei; ted deposit real 
intere rate
Wei ¡ted lending real 
intern ate
8.00 9.20 6.80 4.70 4.10
Cent; aovemment
Total enue 278.50 285.40 314.10 326.20 342.10 326.50
Cur i revenue 277.70 284.40 314.10 326.20 342.10
Curr. t expenditure 290.60 295.70 305.20 292.80 269.40
Curi t account 
balar
-6.20 18.40 21.00 49.30 -42.90
Cap revenue 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cap expenditure 25.90 17.70 18.80 25.00
Ovi ! fiscal balance -31.20 18.40 21.00 24.30
Publ etor external 
debt
128.20 144.40 143.50 132.10 143.90
Inter, payments 6.10 3.80 5.10
Mil. s of Cayman 
Islar lollars
Mon id credit
Do a accredit 1,629.40 1,331.00 1,380.80 1,387.70
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T. • private sector 1,478.30 1,235.70 1,384.80
T. public sector 151.10 95.30 -4.00








Me: iidise balance -502.00 -520.30 -605.30 -674.50
Ex s (f.o.b) 2.40 3.00 4.30 5.50 4.00
In (fo.b) 514.90 494.40 553.50 669.00 747.20
Ser\ balance
To, i receipts 488.90 467.00 458.30 501.30
Supi entary
Visi: i rivals 1,430.20 1,385.00 1,548.90 1,877.60 2,112.50 2,429.38
Not.
Sou





Summary of Damage and Losses caused by Hurricane Ivan
(CI$ million)
Sector Impact Ownership
nd sub sector Total Damage Losses Public Private
To 2,861.1 2,369.6 491.7 124.9 2,735.7
So ! Sectors 1.508.7 1.372.6 136.0 48.2 1.460.5
Edi ition 44.8 43.0 1.8 34.9 9.9
He; ¡1 18.9 9.6 9.3 11.7 7.3
Hot ing 1,444.9 1,320.0 124.9 1.6 1,443.3
Pro i ctive Sectors 931.4 711.3 220.1 931.4
Ag ulture 5.6 0.4 5.2 5.6
Co lerce 463.4 429.0 34.4 463.4
Ti m 462.4 281.9 180.5 462.4
In ' ructure 407.0 285.1 122.2 65.2 341.8
EL icity 68.9 33.9 35.0 5.6 63.3
W r and Wastewater 5.6 4.8 0.8 3.6 2.0
Ri Transport 194.9 146.2 48.7 24.6 170.3
Pi and Airports 15.7 9.7 6.0 13.7 2.0
Ti ommimications 79.5 48.1 31.7 0.3 79.2
Pi Buildings 42.4 42.4 — 17.4 25.0
Ei mment 10.5 0.6 9.9 10.5 —
E. cncy Assistance 3.5 — 3.5 1.0 2.0
S. j : ECLAC
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T able 5
Sum m ary o f  dam age and losses caused  by hurricane Ivan  in Jam aica  
(M illion  Jam aican  D ollars)
Sector 
and subsector
Damage and losses Sector
Total Direct Indirect Public Private
Tota 36,886.3 23,182.2 13,704.1 9,605.8 27,180.5
Soci ; sectors 13.684.6 12.943.3 741.3 2.520.7 11.163.9
Housing 11,163.9 10,474.8 689.1 11,163.9
Education and culture 806.9 794.9 12.0 806.9
Health 758.4 718.2 40.2 758.4
Public buildings 955.4 955.4 955.4
Produt !ve sectors 13.375.6 4.133.3 9.242.3 312.1 13.063.5
Agriculture and livestock 8,550.0 3,407.0 5,143.0 8,550.0
Food processing 2,204.9 210.0 1,994.9 312.1 1,892.8
Mining 1,030.0 50.0 980.0 1,030.0
Tourism 1,590.7 466.3 1,124.4 1,590.7
Infrasiucture 6.987.9 3.545.0 3.442.9 4.117.5 2.770.4
Electricity 1,397.9 589.0 808.9 279.6 1,118.3
Water supply and sanitation 678.7 190.4 488.3 578.7
Transport 3,255.9 2,460.0 795.9 3,199.1 56.8
Telecommunications 1,535.3 198.6 1,336.7 1,535.3
Airports 120.1 107.0 13.1 60.1 60.0
Environnent9 2,560.6 2,560.6 2,560.6
Emergency expenditures 277.6 — 277.6 94.9 182.7
Source: ECLAC.
9 To avoid double accounting, damage to assets already accounted for in other sectors are not included in this figure.
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T a b le  6  
G r e n a d a
Sector Direct damage Indirect
damage
Total
Agriculture 54 46 100
Manufacturing 18 4 22
Wholesale and retail trade 11 11
Tourism 305 101.2 406.2
Electricity 70 21 91
Water/scwage 7 1 8
Telecommunications and broadcasting 76.5 62.4 138.9
Cable 8 5 13
Education 195 1 196
Transport 10.3 1.2 11.5
Housing 1,372 9 1381
Health 11 0 11
Total 2,127 263 2389.6
Table 7 
Bahamas











- Coastal erosion and erosion protection 1,280.00
- Dock s 2,908.10




- Estimated cost of ¡ oad operation and 
transport services in current 
circumstances
3,394.80
- Loss of vehicles 10,500.00
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Ministry of Works and Utilities
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